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PENALITE ET LA COMPENSATION DE LA BANQUE AU PRET 
D’ETUDES SUPERIEUR 
Huang Duo1         Zhang Daohong2        Chen  Aijuan3  
 
Abstract:  The paper mainly researches behavior of banks and students which affects the efficiency 
of Chinese high-educational aid-loan. Using the game theory, the paper analyzes the behavioral 
selection of bank and students in the domestic process of education aid-loan. The paper 
emphatically anatomizes the impact of the reliability of the bank’s claim, the intensity of penalty 
and the degree of the compensation to the behavior of banks and students. Gets the conclusion that, 
under the condition of the credit system lagging, the government should intervene to reduce the cost 
of the claim, raise the success probability of the claim and increase the degree of the penalty to the 
students who default in loan contract，to ensure the healthy development of the education aid-loan. 
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Résumé: Cet article examine principalement les comportements des banques et des étudiants qui 
influent l’efficacité du prêt d’études supérieur chinois. Utilisant la théorie du jeu, l’article analyse la 
sélection comportementale des banques et des étudiants dans le processus du prêt d’études. Il 
disséque catégoriquement les impacts de la fiabilité de la réclamation de la banque, l’intensité de la 
pénalité et le degré de la compensation sur les comportements des banques et des étudiants. Il en 
résulte que, dans le contexte du système de crédit en retard, le gouvernement doit intervenir pour 
réduire le coût de la réclamation, augmenter la probabilité de succès de la réclamation et élever le 
degré de la pénalité infligée aux étudiants qui ne s’aquitte pas de leur prêt, et enfin pour assurer le 
développement sain du prêt d’études. 
Mots-Clés: analyse comportementale, prêt d’études, théorie du jeu 
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 1.  DEVELOPING STATUS OF 
HIGH-EDUCATIONAL AID-LOAN IN 
CHINA 
 
The student loan institution had been established along 
with the developing of charging institution of higher 
education in China. In China the high-educational 
aid-loan institution has been established since 1999, 
State Department, Ministry of finance and others 
relative governments issued a series of documents (for 
example State department issued documents of 
[1999]58, [2000]6,[2000]27, and Ministry of finance  
issued documents of [2000]158 and [2000]1 ) to push 
and fulfill the high-educational aid-loan program. Those 
works energetically promoted the aid-loan project, 
unified the understanding and defined the aim. .  
However as entering the repaying period, the risk of 
default in repaying is emerging. According to the 
incomplete statistic, by the end of the May 2003, in the 
884 universities which issued the aid-loan, there were 
540 thousand students should repay the principal and 
interest, but there were 130 thousand students who can’t 
repay the principal and interest according to the contract, 
involving 227 universities; 9 thousand students 
defaulted more than 90 days, involving 188 universities, 
the defaulting ration of more than 90 days reached 
16.7%. According to the reports of the banks, the ratio 
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of the students who did not contact with banks 
forwardly more than 10%, even exceeded 50%. 
The reasons of students can’t repay according to the 
contracts includes two kinds reasons. One kind is the 
credit consciousness of student is lacking, considering 
the aid-loan is “policy” loan, not will and not want to 
repay, so form the mind of default in repaying; another 
kind is lacking the impersonal ability of repaying, due to 
students can’t find job in time so no income or a little of 
income. 
The process of the high-educational aid-loan can be 
seen as a game process between the bank part and the 
student part. The improving direction of the high- 
educational aid-loan institution should be changing the 
pay-off matrix of two parts in order to ensure the banks 
want to loan and the students like to repay loan. 
 
2.  ANALYZE THE BEHAVIOR OF THE 
PRINCIPAL PARTS OF HIGH 
EDUCATIONAL AID-LOAN WITH 
GAME THEORY 
 
During the process of the aid-loan, two principal parts 
(the banks and the students) of the game continue to 
make decisions basing on the change of the pay-off 
matrix in a dynamic process. In high-educational 
aid-loan project, loan banks and students are principal 
parts. The government provides the interest assistance 
but doesn’t join the game process. Assume the banks 
and students are rational. If the loan were nonprofit the 
banks should not issue loan. However the 
high-educational aid-loan has some features of policy 
loan, the banks have no more selection when decide 
whether loan or not, so the game should begin from the 
decisions of student part. If the benefits of the default 
were higher than that of the repaying, students would 
not repay. Also assume that: there would be no 
opportunity loss if the banks would not issue the loan; 
opportunity cost of the loan is zero, the bank can obtain 
the risk compensation only when students default. So 
can get a complete but imperfect dynamic game process, 
assume the principal is B; the total interest is I, where 
gI is the interest assistance given by the government 
which is the interest generating when the students are in 
universities，Isis the interests paid by the students-self 
after they left universities， s gI=I +I ；Us is the utility of 
the students finish school work; the cost of the banks for 
claiming for debt is CB； L is the penal sum if the banks 
successfully claim; E is the risk compensation. The game 
process is described as the following figure 1: 
 
 
 
In order to facilitate analyzing the behavior of 
students and banks, also give the following 
assumptions: 
1st. Not consider the effect of credit to 
students; 
2nd. Not consider students’ imitation 
behaviors; 
3rd. The probability (p) of the banks claim 
is the    function of perfect extent and executing 
intensity of law; 
4th. There is direct ration between the 
claiming cost and claiming amount, the coefficient is 
a(0≤a≤1);  
5th. The penal sum is n times of arrearage, 
0≤n<∞, the banks stipulate the amount of n in 
advance; 
6th. The essential life requirement is Q in 
the period of repaying. 
 
2.1  Pure strategy game condition 
The principal and interests repaid by students can not be 
subdivided i.e. student only has two selections: 
completely repay or completely default; and the bank 
also only has two selections: claim or not claim. 
There are two preconditions of student repay: 
1st. The expect benefits is greater than 
that of default, i.e. 
( ) (1 )s s s sU I U I L p p B− ≥ − + + −   
Simplifying get: 
1 ( )s s
s
B I pp or L B I
L B I p
+ −≥ ≥ ++ +  
2nd. The income of student after 
graduation is greater than the sum of principal and 
interest. Under the condition of student default, the 
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incentive-compatible condition of bank claim: 
( ) (1 )( )g g BI B E p I L p I E B C− + ≤ + + − + − −
 
Simplifying get: B
s
Cp
I L B E
≥ + + − . 
Under the pure strategy game condition, L and CB 
can be thought decided in advance, so can get the 
following consults: 
（1）When 
s B
s s
B I C
L B I I L B E
+ ≥+ + + + − ；  
i If s B
s s
B I Cp
L B I I L B E
+ ≥ ≥+ + + + − , the 
equilibrium of game would be the student 
will default and the bank would claim； 
ii If B
s
Cp
I L B E
≤ + + − , the equilibrium of 
game would be the student would default and 
the bank would not claim. 
（2）When s B
s s
B I C
L B I I L B E
+ ≤+ + + + − ; 
i If s
s
B Ip
L B I
+≥ + + , though the anticipation 
of bank claim is letter than the anticipation of 
bank do not claim, the threat of bank claim 
would be effective, the equilibrium of game 
would be the student would repay and the 
bank withdraw all principal and interests.  
ii If s
s
B Ip
L B I
+≤ + + , the threat of bank claim 
and penalize would not be effective, the 
equilibrium of game would be the student 
would default and the bank would not claim. 
 
2.2   Mix strategy game condition 
Under the mix strategy game condition, student can 
select to partly repay debt, bank can also select to 
drawback part of principal and interests, and completely 
repayment and completely default are special cases. 
Under this condition, the law support all claim decisions 
of banks, and assume the rate of repayment or claim is 
μ. 
(1) The benefits of student 
The benefit of student default is: 
(1 )s sU I L Bμ μ− − − − ,  
and (1 )( )sL n I Bμ= − + , so the benefits can also 
be: 
[ (1 )] (1 )(1 )s sU n I n Bμ μ μ− + − + − −  
The rate of repayment of student should maximize 
the benefits of default or repayment, i.e.: 
[ (1 )] (1 )(1 ) [ ]s s s sMax U n I n B U Iμ μ μΠ≡ − + − + − − − −
 
After simplified: ( )( )( )1 sI BμΠ ≡ − +1-n  
Then calculate the first rank derivative of П about 
μ： ))(1( BIn s +−−=∂
Π∂
μ  
i. When n<1 , 0
μ
∂Π <
∂
，П is decreasing 
function of μ, student would select 
0μ = ； 
ii. when 1n = , 0
μ
∂Π =
∂
，the amount of μ 
has nothing with the selection of 
student; 
iii. when 1n > , 0
μ
∂Π >
∂
，П is increasing 
function of μ, the student would select 
1μ = . 
(2) The benefits of bank when student default 
Assume E has direct proportion relationship with 
arrearage, its coefficient is b, 0 1b≤ ≤ , and  
( )B sC a B Iμ= + ， 
at same time (1 )( )sE b B Iμ= − + . 
When student default, the benefit of bank should be: 
(1 )
[ (1 ) ]( )
g s B
g s
E I I L E B C
I n b a B I B
μ μ
μ μ μ
= + + + − − −
= + + − − + −  
Calculating the first rank derivative of E about μ：
abnE −−=∂
∂
μ  
Where a、bare uncontrollable variables, n should be 
the main control variable： 
i. When n>a+b， 0E
μ
∂ >
∂
，E is increasing 
function of μ, bank would select 1=μ ； 
ii. When n=a+b , 0E
μ
∂ >
∂
，the amount of μ 
has nothing with the selection of bank; 
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iii. When n<a+b , 0E
μ
∂ <
∂
，E is decreasing 
function of μ, bank would select 0μ = . 
From above analysis can know the reliability (p) of 
bank claim and the penalty intensity (n) will directly 
affect the decisions of both parts. The policy 
significance of this result is, under the condition of 
lacking credit, the institution arrangement should lean 
to safeguard though increase penalty intensity when 
require banks to loan. At present the probability of 
increasing penalty intensity is not great, because banks 
can not control the claim and penalty, it need the 
government intervenes, to reduce the claim cost of 
banks, to increase executing intensity of law, at the same 
time, banks can enhance the nonmonetary penalty 
intensity, in order to avoid the fluky mind. 
 
3.  THE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE 
HIGH-EDUCATIONAL AID-LOAN 
INSTITUTION 
 
For the aid-loan taking the credit as basis，the default 
has subjective reason and objective reason. Reducing 
the objective reason should mainly consider the 
students’ ability of repaying。However the default 
caused by the subjective reason should be the result of 
the moral risk and the information asymmetry, for the 
banks，the keys is the cost of tracking and claiming. 
Because, in China now, the aid-loan is not allowed to 
claim the guarantee and increasing L also be limited by 
law, increasing p、 L and decreasing CB is difficult. 
Therefore，if we want to improve the pay-off matrix of 
this game, make the high-educational aid-loan 
institution develop along a right orientation, should 
effort at following factors. 
1st. Decrease the possibility of the students’ 
default behaviors. The moral culture of the students is 
the key to improve the high-educational aid-loan project. 
The universities should teach and cultivate the students’ 
credit consciousness, make the students treasure own 
credit standing, build up the Victorian ism of insisting 
on honesty and keeping credit. 
2nd. Increase the successful probability of the 
banks’ claim (p) and decrease the cost of tracking and 
claiming(CB). There are two effort orientations: 
short-term effort and long-term effort. In short term, can 
build common information database providing relative 
information about the students who default in repaying 
loan among all relative banks, using the real name 
depositing institution. In order to decrease the claiming 
cost of the banks, increase the successful probability of 
the claim and decrease the students’ expectative benefit. 
For long term，build up the individual credit system is 
the key to resolve this problem. And can consider to 
combine the individual credit system with the guarantee 
system, in order to increase the intensity of tracking the 
defaulted students，increase the successful probability 
of the claim and decrease the tracking cost of the banks . 
3rd. Increase the penal sum(L) ， increase the 
punishment intensity to the students who default in 
repaying 
The punishment to the students defaulted in the 
repaying should include monetary punishment and 
non-monetary punishment. 
For monetary punishment, due to the banks provide 
the loan without guarantee requirement，providing more 
credit to the students, can consider to increase the 
punish sum befittingly, increase the punishment 
intensity to the students who default in repaying. 
For the non-monetary punishment, can build relative 
“blacklist” system, and improve the relative statistic 
system, information exposing system and punishment 
system. The banks and universities can expose the 
information about the students who default in repaying 
debt in different ways and different range. And replant 
the “blacklist” system to the individual credit system 
when it begins to start-up. 
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